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Most people understand a computation as a process evoked when a computational agent acts on its
inputs under the control of an algorithm. The classical Turing machine model has long served as
the fundamental reference model because an appropriate Turing machine can simulate every other
computational model known. The Turing model is a good abstraction for most digital computers
because the number of steps to execute a Turing machine algorithm is predictive of the running
time of the computation on a digital computer. However, the Turing model is not as well matched
for the natural, interactive, and continuous information processes frequently encountered today.
Other models whose structures more closely match the information processes involved give better
predictions of running time and space. Models based on transforming representations may be useful.
1. INTRODUCTION
The question before us – “what is computation?” – is at least as
old as computer science. It is one of those questions that will
never be fully settled because new discoveries and maturing
understandings constantly lead to new insights and questions
about existing models. It is like the fundamental questions in
other fields–for example, “what is life?” in biology and “what
are the fundamental forces?” in physics–that will never be fully
resolved. Engaging with the question is more valuable than
finding a definitive answer.
This symposium is an exploration of the computation
question by many observers. To get the discussion going, I (as
Ubiquity editor) have composed this opening statement. I do
not intend this as a definitive answer, but as a reflection to
stimulate commentary and reactions. The commentators may
not agree with everything in this opening statement or with what
the other commentators have to say. Our hope is that readers will
gain a greater appreciation of pervasiveness of computation
and the value of the ongoing exploration of the nature of
computation.
2. WHY NOW?
Why take up this question now? There are several reasons,
in addition to the opportunity to address this question on the
occasion of the centenary of Alan Turing’s birth.
It was selected as the most important question facing our
field by over one hundred of the two hundred participants
in the Rebooting Computing Summit of January 2009
(http://rebootingcomputing.org). They were trying to come to
grips with the identity of the computing field as they worked
to attract young people and collaborate with others in other
fields.
It addresses the issue of our core identity, which has
been under stress in the past decade because of job growth,
outsourcing, expansion in the number of fields affected by
computing, and internal tensions between various elements of
the computing field.
Many of us desire to be accepted as peers at the “table of
science” and the “table of engineering”. Our current answers to
this question are apparently not sufficiently compelling for us
to be accepted at those tables.
We need to respond to friends and colleagues in other fields
who are discovering new natural computational processes.
They look to us for insights in how the processes work, what
algorithms might be behind them, and how we might collaborate
to discover more.
The term “computational thinking” has recently become
popular [1], after hibernating many years in the jargon of our
field. We are discovering that neither we in the field nor our
friends outside agree on what this term means. Future education
and research policies depend on the answer. We need a better
answer.
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3. HISTORY OF THE TERM COMPUTATION
Our review of the history of computer science reveals an
interesting progression of definitions for computer science [2]:
• study of automatic computing (1940s)
• study of information processing (1950s)
• study of phenomena surrounding computers (1960s)
• study of what can be automated (1970s)
• study of computation (1980s)
• study of information processes, both natural and artificial
(2000s)
Over time, the definition of computer science has been a
moving target. These stages reflect increasingly sophisticated
understandings of computation.
In the 1930s, Kurt Gödel [3], Alonzo Church [4], Emil
Post [5], and Alan Turing [6] independently gave us the
first definitions of computation. Gödel defined it in terms of
the evaluations of recursive functions. Church defined it in
terms of the evaluations of “lambda expressions”, a general
notation for functions. Post defined it as series of strings
successively rewritten according to a given rule set. Turing
defined it the sequence of states of an abstract machine with
a control unit and a tape (the Turing machine). Influenced
by Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, Church, Turing, and
Post discovered functions that could not be evaluated by
algorithms in their systems (undecidable problems). Church
and Turing both speculated that any effective procedure could
be represented within their systems (the Church-Turing thesis).
These definitions underlay the earliest formal notions of
computing.
In the time that these men wrote, the terms “computation” and
“computers” were already in common use, but with different
connotations from today. Computation meant the mechanical
steps followed to evaluate mathematical functions. Computers
were people who did computations. In recognition of the social
changes they were ushering in, the designers of the first digital
computer projects all named their systems with acronyms
ending in “-AC", meaning automatic computer-resulting in
names such as ENIAC, UNIVAC, and EDSAC.
The standard formal definition of computation, repeated
in all the major textbooks, derives from these early ideas.
Computation is defined as the execution sequences of halting
Turing machines (or their equivalents). An execution sequence
is the sequence of total configurations of the machine,
including states of memory and control unit. The restriction
to halting machines is there because algorithms were intended
to implement functions: a nonterminating execution sequence
would correspond to an algorithm trying to compute an
undefined value.
The famous ACM Curriculum 1968 [7] was the first
curriculum recommendation in computer science. It translated
these formal definitions into practice by defining computation
as information processes generated by algorithms. They said
the field consists of three main parts: information structures and
processes, information processing systems, and methodologies.
Around 1970, Edsger Dijkstra began to distinguish
algorithms from computations. An algorithm, he said, is a static
description, a computation the dynamic state sequence evoked
from a machine by an algorithm. The computation is the actual
work. He wanted to constrain the structure of algorithms so
that the correctness of their computations could more easily
be proved. With this he launched the structured programming
movement.
The computer science formalists were not the only ones
interested in a mathematical definition of computation. In
the OS (operating systems) world, the process (short for
computational process) became a central concern [8–10]. A
process was intended as an entity containing the execution of
an algorithm on a machine. Dennis and Van Horn defined a
process as “locus of control through an instruction sequence”
[8]. Coffman, Denning, and Organick defined process as the
sequence of states of processor and memory for a program
in execution [10,11]. The process abstraction enabled time-
sharing: processes could be suspended from the processor and
resumed later. The OS interpretation of process differed from
the formal interpretation in one key point: An OS process could
be intentionally nonterminating.
During the 1960s there was considerable debate on the
definition of computer science. Many were concerned that
the formal definition of computation was too restrictive;
for example, the new field of artificial intelligence was not
obviously computational. Newell, Simon, and Perlis proposed
to remedy this by broadening to include all “phenomena
surrounding computers” [12,13]. At the same time, many were
also concerned about whether the word science in the title
was deserved. Economics Nobel Laureate Herb Simon claimed
that some fields of study, such as economics and computer
science, are sciences even though they did not study natural
processes [14]. Because they encompassed new phenomena that
most people considered computational, these new definitions
were widely accepted. This was a fundamental shift in the
understanding of computation, which now became pegged to the
activities in and around computers rather than to the presumed
algorithmic nature of information processes.
A few years later, the COSERS project team, led by Bruce
Arden, tied the definition of computation to a concern for
automation [15]. This connected computation even more firmly
to the actions of machines.
In the mid and late 1980s, the computational science
movement, which was backed by scientists from many fields,
claimed computation (and computational thinking) as a new
way of doing science [16,17]. Supercomputers were their main
tools. But now computation was more than the activity of
machines; it was a practice of discovery and a way of thinking.
Finally, in the 1990s, scientists from natural science fields
started to claim that information processes exist in their deep
structures [18]. David Baltimore argued this for biology [19]
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and those working on quantum computing argued it for physics
[20]. Today, computation is seen as a natural process as well as
an artificial one. This is a serious challenge to the tradition of
definitions tying computation to computers.
4. NEW DEVELOPMENTS
Since the basic definition of computation was established, there
have been three significant developments that call for rethinking
the basic reference model.All three indicate classes of processes
that most people agree are computations, but which do not fit
the form of the basic Turing machine.
Interactive computing. Many systems, such as operating
systems, Web servers, and the Internet itself, are designed to
run indefinitely and not halt. Halting is an abnormal event
for these systems. The traditional definition of computation
is tied to algorithms, which halt. Execution sequences of
machines running indefinitely seem to violate the definition.
Goldin, Smolka, and Wegner [21] assembled a book of 18
contributions by authors who thought interactive computing to
be computation, even though it didn’t fit the standard formal
definition. The term “reactive system” is often used for a system
that continues its operation indefinitely and responds to stimuli
from the environment. A proposed solution to the definition
problem is to expand the definition to include reactive systems
as well as algorithmic computing machines. (I personally prefer
the term “interactive system” to “reactive system” because
interactive also allows the system to generate output signals
and not just react to incoming signals.)
In discussing games, James Carse said: “A finite game is
played for the purpose of winning, an infinite game for the
purpose of continuing the play.” [22] When applied to our
situation, his insight highlights the fundamental difference
between computations and algorithms (they are finite games)
and computations from nonterminating systems (they are
infinite games).
Natural information processes. Leading thinkers in various
science fields have declared that they have discovered
information processes in nature. The most conspicuous of
these claims is in Biology, where DNA is seen as an encoded
representation of a living organism and DNA translation is an
information process that transforms the code into amino acids
[19]. Similar claims are coming from physicists who see natural
information processes behind quantum mechanics and other
natural phenomena. Perhaps the most sweeping version of this
claim is Wolfram’s [23]; he believes that all of nature is an
information process (best described by cellular automata) even
though we do not know (or may never know) the algorithms
that generate natural processes. Computer science has been
challenged to redefine computation in a way that accommodates
these discoveries.
Continuous information processes. Turing machines are
discrete entities that work with finite strings of symbols from
a finite alphabet. This definition excludes analog computing,
which was very important in the 1920s and continues in some
electrical engineering specialties today. In the 1920s, Vannevar
Bush developed the differential analyzer, a machine of gears,
levers, and rotating shafts that could solve differential equations.
Electrical engineers developed their own versions of analog
differential equation solvers; these technologies are still in use
today.Why is solving a differential equation on a supercomputer
a computation but solving the same equation with an electrical
network is not?
Turing himself argued that in the real world measurement
error limits the granularity at which we can observe continuous
processes; therefore there is no practical difference between
what discrete and continuous machines can compute. Others are
not so sure because a simple roundoff error in the machine can
cause its prediction of a continuous function to err significantly.
The mathematical models (such as partial differential
equations) used in science and engineering assume continuous
functions on real numbers. Many optimal algorithms for making
predictions with these models are formulated without reference
to a Turing model and lead to more accurate predictions of
computational work than can be obtained from a Turing model
of the same solution method [24].
Claude Shannon (a student of Bush) said that continuous
signals contain information and that his information theory
applies to all such signals [25]; he focused on discrete (binary)
signals because they were the coming wave in communication
systems. Today we use his information theory for discrete
computing but ignore it for continuous information signals.
Software radios today use signal processing algorithms to
sample and decode radio signals. Why is the action of a software
radio a computation but not the action of an Armstrong FM
circuit? Paolo Rocchi (IBM, Rome Italy) has just completed
a book showing that there is no clear boundary between
analog and digital computation [26]. He challenges us to define
computation in a way that encompasses both.
5. RETHINKING THE DEFINITION
Computation is always defined relative to a computational
model that specifies the agent performing the computation.
Computation is seen as a process generated by that agent.
Any of the four computational models proposed in the
1930s – recursive functions, rewriting rules, lambda-calculus,
and Turing machine – could have been used as the reference
model for computation. The Turing machine won that
designation because it most closely resembled the new
generation of digital electronic computers.
Over the years, new computational models were proposed
including probabilistic machines, non-deterministic machines,
parallel program schemata, Petri Nets, neural networks, DNA
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string systems, and others. Every one of these systems was found
to be Turing equivalent. This bolstered belief in the Church-
Turing thesis and reaffirmed the reference model status of the
Turing machine.
So, what is the problem with the Turing model? To many, the
Turing machine model is a poor representation of the systems
they are interested in. For example, a DNA molecule being
transcribed does not resemble a moveable control unit on an
infinite tape. The theorems about running times of algorithms
on Turing machines do not help mathematicians solving
continuous models predict the running times of their models.
Suppose that we dropped our insistence that the Turing model
is the unique basis of computation? That would mean not only
that we could use Turing-equivalent models that more clearly
fit the domains we are studying, but also that we could get more
accurate predictions of computational work in those domains
than we could with Turing machine models. We would have
more options for designing near-optimal methods for solving
problems.
6. A TRANSFORMATION OF REPRESENTATIONS
MODEL
Let us consider an alternative based on a model of information
process that may be useful when the computations appear to
be strings or streams, such as in DNA translation, genetic
algorithms, and analog computing.
A representation is a pattern of symbols that stands for
something. The association between a representation and what
it stands for can be recorded as a link in a table or database
or as a memory in people’s brains. There are two important
aspects of representations: syntax and stuff. Syntax is the
rules for constructing patterns; it allows us to distinguish
patterns that stand for something from patterns that do not.
Stuff is measurable physical states of the world that hold
representations, usually in media or signals. Put these two
together and we can build machines that can detect when a
valid pattern is present.
Even this simple notion of a representation has deep
consequences. For example, there is no algorithm for finding
the shortest possible representation of something [27].
Unfortunately, information processes can be treacherous
territory, because “information” is such an ill-defined and
conflicted term, despite many efforts to establish international
standards for its definition. Most definitions of information
involve an objective component (signs and the things
represented by signs) and a subjective component (the
meanings). Rocchi says that information consists of a sign
(representation), a referent (the thing represented), and an
observer [26]. The objective parts of information are in the signs
and referents, while the subjective part is in the observer. How
can we base a scientific field on something with such a strong
subjective component?
Biologists have a similar problem with life. Life scientist
Robert Hazen notes that biologists have no precise definition
of life, but they do have a list of seven criteria for when an
entity is living [28]. The observable affects of life, such as
chemistry, energy, and reproduction, are sufficient to ground the
science of biology. In the same way, we can ground a science
of information on the observable affects (signs and referents)
without a precise definition of “meaning".
Despite these cautions, representation-transformation can be
a reference model of computing. An information process is a
sequence of representations. (In the physical world, it is a contin-
uously evolving, changing representation.) A computation is an
information process in which the transitions from one element
of the sequence to the next are controlled by a representation.
(In the continuous world, we would say that each infinitesimal
time and space step is controlled by a representation.)
The representation-transformation model does not enlarge
the class of functions that can be computed; representations
and their representation-controlled transformations are
Turing-equivalent. Its value is as a model of computations
that naturally describes not only the traditional processes
of computing machines, but also non-terminating processes,
natural processes, and continuous processes.
7. EXAMPLES
Let us examine a quick series of examples as sanity checks that
this definition can work for the cases we described earlier.
The sequence of configurations of a Turing machine is
obviously a computation in this interpretation.
The non-terminating, interactive processes of operating
systems and the Web are also clearly computations in this
interpretation.
DNA translation is a natural information process. The DNA is
taken as “genetic code” and is composed of long strings made up
of four types of base pairs. DNA translation is a rule-based pro-
cess that “reads” the code and produces amino acids. Douglas
Hofstadter was one of the first to notice that DNA transcription
can be interpreted as a Turing-machine like process [29].
Quantum computing represents information as “qubits”
(superpositions of the “0” and “1” states of a bit) and
quantum algorithms as methods of transforming qubits. In some
cases, such as factoring with Schor’s algorithm, a quantum
computer can solve problems in polynomial time that would
take exponential time on conventional computers.
Science problems represented as continuous mathematical
models operating with real numbers are continuous information
processes.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The computational model of representation-transformation
refocuses the definition of computation from computers to
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information processes. This model shows that representa-
tions are more fundamental than computers because repre-
sentations appear in many situations where no computer is
present.
This is actually a fundamental shift. It relinquishes the
early idea that “computer science is the study of phenomena
surrounding computers” and emphasizes that “computer
science is the study of information processes”. Computers
are a means to implement some information processes. But
not all information processes are implemented by computers-
for example, DNA translation, quantum information, optimal
methods for continuous systems. Getting computers out of the
central focus may seem hard but is natural. Dijkstra once said,
“Computer science is no more about computers than astronomy
is about telescopes”.
Are algorithms really the heart of computing? Or is the more
fundamental and inclusive notion of representations the heart?
Science is discovering information processes for which no
algorithm is known; might some of those information processes
have no algorithms at all?
This model does not resolve the tortured question of “what
is information?” It deals with the objective parts of information
(representations and the mappings to their referents) and but
does not depend on the subjective aspect of information (the
individual observer). We can proceed without solving the
observer problem.
This definition of computation also supports a clear definition
of computational thinking. Computational thinking is an
approach to problem solving that represents the problem as
an information process relative to a computational model
(which may have to be invented or discovered) and seeks an
algorithmic solution. The pioneers of our field used the term
“algorithmic thinking” to describe how the thought processes
of computer scientists differ from other sciences [13]. In the
1980s, the term “computational thinking” was commonly used
to describe the way that computational scientists approached
problem solving, which they characterized as a new paradigm
of science [30]. I am concerned, however, that the conception
of computational thinking as a method of problem solving
may sound too close to Polya [31] and may not call sufficient
attention the aspects that make computing unique in the
world [32].
We have been too willing in our field to embrace major terms
without clear definitions (for example, software engineering,
structured programming, and cloud computing). When we do
not explicitly declare that we are on a quest for a clearer
definition, we allow others (and ourselves) to think we are
satisfied with the imprecision. This is a paradox because
our field demands great precision-the smallest error in a
representation can invalidate all subsequent results. It surprises
me that we do not collectively demand more precision in the
words we use to describe who we are and what we do. I am
hoping that this symposium will help us to accomplish that with
one of our most fundamental notions.
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